This paper presents a unified model of the default and prepayment behavior of homeowners in a proportional hazard framework. The model uses the option-based approach to analyze default and prepayment, and considers these two interdependent hazards as competing risks.
Introduction
This paper presents a unified model of the default and prepayment behavior of homeowners in a context which recognizes these hazards as competing risks. The model uses the option-based approach to analyze default and prepayment, that is, it views default as a put option and prepayment as a call option. The additional model also recognizes that the borrower, by exercising one of these two options, gives up the right to exercise the other option.
The model is applied to analyze a current policy proposal -transferring resources and stimulating homeownership by offering low downpayment loans.
For instance, it has been proposed recently that the federal government, through FHA, insure zero downpayment mortgage loans for low income families. 1 We do not estimate the effectiveness of this policy at stimulating homeownership, but we do use our model to estimate program costs. We do this by comparing default probabilities and costs on zero downpayment loans to conventional loans requiring a five or ten percent downpayment. Obviously the subsidy inherent in zero downpayment loans compared to conventional loans depends on the pricing 1 Under the Clinton administration's fall 1994 initiative, mortgages would be targeted to firsttime homebuyers with incomes below 115 percent of the median for the metropolitan area of residence. Mortgage amounts would be limited to the lesser or 75 percent of the FHA 203(b) loan limit for the location or 100 percent of property value. of these loans. We can estimate subsidy costs directly if the difference in risk is not priced. FHA has, historically, not varied price significantly by downpayment. 2 The starting point for option-based models is the contingent claims model, developed by Black and Scholes [3] and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross [8] . A number of studies have applied this model to the mortgage market (e.g., Dunn and McConnell [12] , Buser and Hendershott [5] , Brennan and Schwartz [4] , Kau et al [18] [19], Quigley and Van Order [23] ). Hendershott and Van Order [16] , and Kau and Keenan [20] provide surveys of these models and results.
The key result of these models is that the exercise of each option depends on both house prices and interest rates. The default option is in the money when a borrower's equity is negative, and the prepayment option is in the money when the present value of the remaining payments is less when discounted at the current interest rate rather than the mortgage coupon rate. The contingent claims model describes how far into the money these options must be in order for it to be optimal for the borrower to exercise one of them. If there are any transactions costs, the mathematics of all this gets quite complicated. Empirical work exploiting the 2 Prior to 1991, the FHA did not vary price by initial loan-to-value ratio (LTV). Currently all borrowers pay an up-front premium of 2.25 percent. They also pay one half of one percent of the loan balance each year for seven (in the case of LTV < 90 percent) to thirty (in the case of LTV > 95 percent) years. As indicated by our estimates below, the current variation does not nearly match the variation in risk.
option perspective has generally taken a probabilistic approach: each option is more likely to be exercised the further it is "in the money."
Several recent empirical studies have applied the Cox proportional hazard model [7] to evaluate mortgage default or prepayment risk (e.g., Green and Shoven [15] , Schwartz and Torous [25] , Quigley and Van Order [22] [23] ). Instead of solving for the unique critical values of the state variables in the contingent claims model, the proportional hazard model assumes that at each point in time during the mortgage contract period, the mortgage has a certain probability of termination, conditional upon the survival of the mortgage. The hazard function in this model is defined as the product of a baseline hazard and a function of time-varying covariates. These covariates need not be limited to the option value itself; they may include other important determinants of behavior. The proportional hazard model can thus incorporate reasonable mortgage prepayment and default behavior that would be considered "sub-optimal" under the pure contingent claims framework.
However, few of the existing empirical models have treated the interdependence of borrowers' prepayment and default options. For example, Schwartz and Torous [25] analyzed GNMA mortgage prepayment experience by using a model with fixed covariates 3 and assuming the mortgages were free of default risk. More general models using time-varying covariates, by Green and Shoven [15] and Quigley and
Van Order [22] , made analogous assumptions in the analysis of prepayment behavior. Cunningham and Hendershott [10] analyze default costs in an optimizing context with transactions cost and a single hazard. Quigley and Van Order [23] studied default behavior using the model of a single hazard as well. Foster and
Van Order [14] do estimate both default and prepayment, but they use highly aggregated data on mortgage pools.
The Model
In this paper we model the mortgage termination in a competing risks framework.
The competing risks of mortgage termination consist of two parts: a prepayment risk and a default risk. The function specifying prepayment risk estimates the probability that a mortgage loan is prepaid during any period, conditional on survival to that particular period. Similarly, the default function estimates the conditional probability of default during each period. The model assumes that the borrower makes the prepayment or default decision based upon market conditions 3 The option-related financial and economic variables relevant to mortgages clearly vary over time, so it would have been more appropriate to specify the model with time-varying covariates.
to maximize net wealth. Following the contingent claims model, we assume that the probability of exercising these options is a function of the extent to which they are "in the money" and of "trigger events" that affect the decision about how far the option need be into the money in order for exercise to be optimal. For instance, an increase in the probability of negative equity will increase the probability that the put option is in the money, and hence increase the probability of default.
Examples of trigger events include such economic variables as employment or divorce. 4 One particular feature of mortgage prepayment and default is the possibility of right censoring. There are two sources of censoring:
First, some mortgage loans may simply mature under the contract, and some mortgages may not terminate by the end of data collection period. For those mortgage loans, we simply never observe their actual durations to default or prepayment; Second, and more importantly, if a mortgage loan has defaulted, it cannot be prepaid in the future. Thus defaulted loans are treated as censored data for the prepayment function, and prepaid loans are treated as censored data for the default functions.
Both of these mechanisms are random censoring. It is reasonable to assume the former random censoring mechanism (e.g., the maturation of loans) is independent of the default or prepayment failure time series. However, the latter mechanism need not be an independent random censoring mechanism at all. Indeed, for this reason, we should expect there to be a correlation between defaults and prepayments. 5 
A Semiparametric Estimation Approach for the Proportional Hazard Model
A major concern in actually estimating hazard models of mortgage prepayment and default behavior is the computational difficulty involved. Useful models must be specified in short time intervals (e.g., months or quarters), but mortgage terms are typically written for thirty years. Computational time can become a real constraint when the model involves time-varying covariates. To estimate a useful model for the housing market requires either dramatically limiting sample sizes, arbitrarily and unreasonably aggregating time intervals, or else finding a way to aggregate observations on individual behavior. 6 In this paper, we use a semiparametric estimation approach (SPE) to estimate the proportional hazard model with competing risks and time-varying covariates.
This approach is described in detail elsewhere [11] ; here we merely sketch out the major points.
Define T ∈ R + as a duration variable. Let T i (i = 1, 2, ..., q) be the discrete time intervals that partition the support of T . Let
be the conditional probability of a mortgage terminating at t. Here j = 1 is the prepayment function and j = 2 is the default function.
A log integrated hazard function for risk type j can be constructed:
and
given that Z j (t) is constant between T i−1 and T i .
The left-hand side of equation (2.2) is not directly observable in micro data.
We can, however, use the "local smoothing" technique, developed in the literature on non-parametric methods, to estimate individual hazard functions based on the empirical distribution of the hazard functions. Partition the covariate matrix Z into K distinct matrices Z 1 , ..., Z K . The kth subgroup contains M k observations.
where N is the total sample size. For each subgroup, estimate the hazard rate such that b h jkt = n jkt S kt , where n jkt is the number of loans which are terminated in the tth period with type j in the kth subgroup, and S kt is the total number of loans surviving to the tth period in the kth subgroup. 7 Now, replacing the left-hand side of equation (2.2) with the smoothed log 7 Note the risk set of the conditional hazard rates includes not only the loans that have the same termination type, but also all those loans which have a different termination type, as long as the age of termination is greater than the current one. Furthermore, the risk set also includes those right-censored observations if the censored time point is greater than the current termination time.
hazard function, log
For a model in which time is measured in discrete intervals, say, quarters,
The covariance of the ε j 's captures the correlation among competing risks.
Equations (2.4) and (2.5) are seemingly unrelated regression systems that can be analyzed using the approach proposed by Zellner [28] . It has been shown elsewhere [11] that the coefficient vector b β estimated from equation (2.4) is consistent. closed), indicators of prepayment or default, the purchase price of the property, the original loan amount, the initial loan-to-value ratio, the mortgage contract interest rate, the monthly principal and interest payment, the state, the region and the major metropolitan area in which the property is located. The data set also reports the borrower's monthly gross income at loan origination. For the mortgage default and prepayment model, censored observations include all matured loans as well as the loans active at the end of the period.
The analysis is confined to 30 year fixed rate mortgage loans issued for owner occupancy, and includes only those loans which were either closed or still active at the first quarter of 1992. 8 The analysis is confined to loans issued in 26 major metropolitan areas (MSAs). The data set contains 780,443 observations. Loans are observed in each quarter from the quarter of origination through the quarter of termination, maturation, or through 1992:I for loans still active.
To estimate the model, the entire sample of 780,443 loans has been partitioned into 312 groups, according to 26 major MSAs, 4 household income levels, and 3 LTV groups. 9 For each group, there are 64 cells, reflecting failure time periods (measured in quarter, from 76:II to 92:I). We use the Kaplan-Meier approach to fit the empirical hazard rates of prepayment and default based on the entire sample.
Then the estimated empirical hazard rates were mapped to 11,866 mortgage loans that were randomly drawn from the total sample. 10 We assume that the randomlydrawn subsample has the same distribution as the population. The key variables in the theoretical model are those measuring the extent to which the put and call options are in the money. To value the call option, the current interest rate, and the initial contract terms are sufficient. We compute a variable "P OP T ION" measuring the ratio of the present discounted value of the unpaid mortgage balance at the current quarterly market interest rate 11 relative to the value discounted at the contract interest rate.
12
To value the put option analogously, we need to measure the market value of each house quarterly and to compute homeowner equity quarterly. Obviously, we 11 The rate used is the average interest rate charged by lenders on new first mortgages reported by Freddie Mac's quarterly market survey (the "effective Freddie rate"). This mortgage interest rate varies by quarter across five major US regions. 12 Specifically, poption for the lth loan observation is defined as
where τ i is loan age measured in quarters, ω l is a vector of indices for geographical location, κ l is loan origination time, mopipmt l is monthly principal and interest payment, noterate l is mortgage note rate, mktrate ω l ,κ l +τ i , is the current local market interest rate, and term l is do not observe the course of price variation for individual houses in the sample.
We do, however, have access to a large sample of repeat ( 
where origamt l is original loan amount. 13 Housing price indices and their volatilities are estimated according to the three stage procedure suggested by Case and Shiller [6] and modified by Quigley and Van Order [23] . The model assumes that log price for ith house at time t is given by
where I t is the logarithm of the regional housing price level, H it is a Gaussian random walk, such that,
and N it is white noise, such that,
The model is estimated on paired sales of owner occupied housing. In the first stage, the log price of the second sale minus the log price of the first sale is regressed on a set of dummy variables, one for each time period in the sample except the first period. The dummy variables have values of zero in every quarter except the quarter in which the sales occurred. For the quarter of the first sale, the dummy is −1, and for the quarter of the second sale, the dummy is Estimates of the mean and variance of individual house prices, together with the unpaid mortgage balance (computed from the contract terms), permit us to estimate the distribution of homeowner equity quarterly for each observation. In particular, "EQR" is the estimate of equity ratio assuming prices of all houses in the MSA grow at the mean rate, "P NEQ" is the probability that equity ratio is negative, i.e., the probability that the put option is in the money. and variance
Means and Variances are estimated for each of 26 major MSA regions using samples of paired sales. There are about four million paired sales in the Freddie Mac data base.
14 Specifically, equity ratio for the lth loan observation is defined as:
For each mortgage loan observation, we calculate the ratio of household reported income (at origination) to the MSA median income level. We then create four dummy variables, "INCLL", "INCL", "INCH", and "INCHH" to separate household income level into four groups. 15 As proxies for other "trigger events," we include measures of the quarterly unemployment rate and the annual divorce rate. 16 Unfortunately, we do not have access to borrower's credit history, which might be important in determining default. Hence, we assume that the model has heterogeneous error terms due to these omitted variables.
where purprice l is the purchasing price of the house at the time of loan initiation, and pdvunpblc l is the present discounted value of the remaining loan balance. The probability of negative equity, pneq, is thus
where pdvunpblc l and mktvalue l are defined above, ncdf (·) is cumulative standard normal distribution function, and e 2 ω l ,κ l +τ i is the estimated volatility of the housing price index using the WRS procedure. 15 Specifically, incll takes value one if the ratio of the household reported income to the MSA median level is less than or equal to 0.6, and zero otherwise; incl takes value one if the ratio lies between 0.6 and 1.0, and zero otherwise; inch takes value one if the ratio lies between 1.0 and 1.5, and zero otherwise; and inchh takes value one if the ratio is above 1.5, and zero otherwise. 16 Unemployment and divorce rates are measured at the state level. State unemployment data are reported in various issues of: US Department of Labor, "Employment and Unemployment in States and Local Areas (Monthly)" and in the "Monthly Labor Review". State divorce data are reported in various issues of U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, "Vital Statistics of the United States, Volume III, Marriage and Divorce", and in "Statistical Abstract of the U.S.". Table 1 presents a variety of models estimated by the SPE method, specifying the prepayment and default functions as a seemingly unrelated regression system.
The Empirical Results
The results from all four models show that financial motivation is of paramount importance in affecting the prepayment and default behavior. When the call option is in the money, the prepayment hazard increases substantially. Similarly, a higher probability of negative equity increases the default hazard substantially for all income groups. Note that a higher probability of negative equity also reduces the prepayment hazard, reflecting the negative relationship between the values of these two options.
The coefficients estimated for the interaction between household income level and the equity variables from models 3 and 4 convey consistent information. Lower income households are more sensitive to lower equity values when making decisions to exercise the put option -that is, lower income households are at greater risk for default than high income households when equity values decline. This is true for each comparison if we exclude the highest income households. The results show that the very wealthy households ( i.e., those with a ratio of household income to the MSA median income above 1.5) are apparently more likely to behave in a ruthless fashion in the face of equity declines.
The results are consistent with simple tabulations indicating that both low income and high income borrowers tend to default more than borrowers with moderate incomes (e.g., Van Order and Schnare [26] .) However, the results also reveal a pattern of different responses toward declining equity among different income groups.
The results from all four models show that higher unemployment and divorce rates will lower the prepayment hazard -indicating that liquidity constraints (which make refinancing more difficult for unemployed and divorced households) keep them from exercising in-the-money call options. However, the coefficient estimates for these two variables are less stable in the default function. 17 For each of the models reported in table 1, we have also estimated baseline hazard for prepayment and default; this estimation is discussed in detail in Quigley, Van Order and Deng [24] . We now apply these models and the estimated baselines to simulate effects of low downpayment loans.
Simulations of Default Losses and Program Costs
The simulations of default losses are based on model 4 in Table 1 . We use Freddie Mac's existing simulation model to generate 300 paths of mortgage market rates and 300 paths of house price inflation rates according a joint stochastic meanreverting process. We consider three alternative patterns of housing price change: average annual appreciation rates of five and ten percent, and a benchmark case of zero percent change, on average. We fix the divorce rate at the mean and vary the aggregate unemployment rate between four percent and eight percent.
For each scenario, we calculate 10,000 default hazard rates for zero downpayment loans, five percent and ten percent downpayment loans for the first 15 years of the mortgage loan period. We do this by the repeated sampling of housing prices and interest rates from the joint distributions and the calculation of conditional default and prepayment probabilities for each draw. Table 2 presents estimates of the average default rates associated with these economic conditions. The table presents the default rate, cumulated over fifteen years, for zero downpayment loans and also for conventional mortgage loans covering 90 and 95 percent, respectively, of house purchase. Not surprisingly, the probability of ever defaulting is sensitive to variations in housing prices and also to the aggregate unemployment rate. Default probabilities are also quite sensitive to the required downpayment as well as household income level. Consider "lower income home purchases," i.e., households with incomes below 60 percent of the MSA median level. The simulations suggest that, with zero down payment loans, these households would have cumulative default rates about twice as high as those whose mortgages require ten percent down -when house prices appreciate at 10 percent annually and the unemployment rate is 8 percent. With zero downpayment loans, these households would have cumulative default rates about four times as high as those whose mortgages require ten percent down -when house price levels are constant. by Van Order and Zorn [27] . These severities, together with the time path of (unconditional) defaults, yield the time paths of losses. Table 3 summarizes the estimated costs of the subsidy program. The table reports the present value of the losses over a fifteen year period, using an interest rate of ten percent. The first column of Table 3 reports the appropriate price, The actual program costs depend upon the pricing of these mortgages to consumers. If they were priced in a manner appropriate to mortgages with ten percent downpayments, the additional estimated program costs are around two to four percent of funds made available -when housing prices increase steadily.
Conclusions
In an economy where the house prices do not appreciate, the costs of the program would be much larger indeed. Our estimates suggest that additional program costs would be between $74,000 and $87,000 per million dollars of lending, for borrowers with incomes below 60 percent of the MSA median. If the expected losses from the program were not priced at all, the losses from default could exceed ten percent of the funds available for loans. Note: All models estimated by seemingly unrelated regressions using obervations on 11,866 mortgages. t ratios in parentheses. 
